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1 
 
The aftermath of events on September 11, 2001 shows the 
importance of film, television, and other electronic media in 
constructing our political realities.  Soon the Bush administration 
was working with Hollywood screenwriters to help anticipate 
possible targets and scenarios for further terrorist atrocities.  Yet 
the main Hollywood contributions had come earlier, even before 
September 11, through popular films.  These let American 
audiences experience acts of political terrorism in vicarious, 
virtual, symbolical, and other modes.1  Now, in response to the 
dramatic escalation of terrorist attacks on U.S. institutions, 
Americans can call on cinematic prefigurations of terrorist 
strategies, the movements and states that use them, the regimes 
that support them, and the politics that reply to them. 
 
 
2 
 
Hence we do well to consider how Hollywood mythmaking from 
the 1980s onward has helped us to characterize terrorism, 
connections between American and Middle-Eastern politics, 
attacks on the virtue or viability of Western Civilization, and more.  
Here the emphasis is on the Hollywood aesthetics available to 
influence American experiences of terrorism and responses to it.  
What networked figures of sight, sound, story, and concept from 
popular films contribute to American senses of terrorist acts and 
world politics in the wake of the September 11 atrocities?  What are 
their principal sources?  And what may be said of their political 
trajectories? 
 
 
3 
 
The argument is that, especially through the aesthetic packages 
that we call popular genres, Hollywood cinema has been 
prefiguring our experiences of the events of September 11, their 
aftermath, and other acts of political terrorism.  Popular genres 
occur in myriad media.2  In the movies, they are families of 
conventions for cinematography, mise-en-scène, story, dialogue, 
acting, editing, music, even marketing.3  This is to say that popular 
genres are aesthetics.  They provide templates for our personal and 
political experiences.  Four of these forms are particularly 
pertinent for analyzing the looks, sounds, and dramas of political 
terrorism that we encounter on the silver screen.  These popular 
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genres of cinema are horror, dystopia, thriller, and noir. 
 
4 
 
Events over the last decade shifted American sensibilities and 
Hollywood movies away from a Cold War conflict that had pitted 
the Communist Iron Curtain in the East against the Free World of 
Democracy in the West.  As much or more than any administration 
or foreign-affairs contingent, popular movies have been helping to 
turn American attention away from villainous Commies out to 
undo Democracy in America.  Hollywood has played a leading role 
in replacing the outdated villains of the Evil Empire with Ruthless 
Terrorists ranging from the Middle East to Middle America.  
Often, but not always, cinematic terrorists have hated Western 
ways.  Often, but not always, they have declared total, albeit 
asymmetrical, war against America’s hegemony as the world’s only 
remaining military, political, and cultural superpower.  Often, but 
not always, they have been pointedly or vaguely Arabic in look and 
sound.  (Many nationalities do surface.) 
 
 
5 
 
As widely noted, these figures have become so familiar to 
Americans – principally from Hollywood films – that the 
journalistic and popular presumption at first was that terrorists 
with ties to the Middle East had obliterated the federal building in 
Oklahoma City.  Although the American militia movement had not 
been ignored altogether by the popular media in America, Timothy 
McVeigh still came as a special shock to the country.  Furthermore 
his mythic figure has yet to become commonplace in popular films 
about political terrorism.  Hollywood already has filled most roles 
for terrorists with figures from afar, and its arsenals of terrorist 
plots twist more toward international machinations. 
 
 
6 
 
Fortunately for Americans in the twentieth century, Hollywood 
supplied more numerous and sometimes more vivid instances of 
political terrorism than the country’s enemies.  Neither America’s 
political elites nor its mass publics concentrated sustained 
attention on political terrorism prior to the atrocities wrought in 
2001 by al Qaeda.  Not even terrorist bombings in the 1990s of the 
World Trade Center, the Murrah Federal Building, and American 
foreign embassies crowded out the sights and sounds of terrorism 
as genred by movie conventions increasingly global in their 
ambition and impact.  This was due in important part to the 
enormous commercial success and cultural reach of Hollywood 
products, distributed to audiences almost everywhere in the 
world.  By September 11, the earlier terrorist acts mainly had 
become fuel for still more imaginative and graphic films.  
Consequently the phenomenal field for experiencing and 
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responding to political terrorism remained wide open to 
prefiguration by Hollywood films. 
 
 
 Figures and Phenomena  
 
7 
 
Americans have been making sense of terrorist events and 
concerting themselves to action with the help of Hollywood 
aesthetics.  This is happening even though these popular styles are 
being disrupted in various degrees by the emerging politics that 
they have helped to prefigure.  Borrowing from the Santa Cruz 
meta-historian Hayden White, we might observe that popular 
movies in the last two or three decades have been contributing to a 
“prefiguration of the phenomenal field” for political terrorism – as 
we are coming to know and contest it in the wake of 9/11.4 
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Recent dynamics of terrorism are no exception.  Through a 
Hollywood war movie, we could re-experience Mogadishu in 
Somalia with a Black Hawk Down (2001) years after the dust had 
settled from the disastrous moments of an aid mission in 1993.  
Through a political thriller, we could anticipate the experience of 
New York City under The Seige (1998) of terrorist attacks, years 
before the fall of 2001.  Through a foreign dystopia, set in Bab El 
Oued City (1994), we could feel the effects of individual moves to 
resist or escape the encompassing system of regime terrorism in 
Algeria.  Through the experimental cinema of The Tornado (1996), 
we could do the same for the anarchical system of civil-war 
terrorism in Lebanon.  And through the blockbuster entertainment 
of The Sum of All Fears (2002), we could sense the frustrating 
complications in endeavors to resist the residual system of Cold 
War suspicions when trying to avert nuclear war spurred by rogue 
acts of nuclear terrorism. 
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The phenomenal field is the vague situation of events and 
experiences that start to take particular shapes and come into our 
specific awareness as we encounter them.  Both existential 
phenomenologists and social cognitionists have suggested in 
various ways that, even before we consciously configure (let alone 
interpret) our experiences of events, we must prefigure them as 
diffuse and initial kinds of occurrences.5  For cognitive science, the 
clear implication can seem paradoxical:  before – or at least as – 
we cognize experience, we must re-cognize its elements.  
Otherwise cognition as form and dynamic must lack any content 
on which to work.  Cognition depends on – more or less prior – 
recognition.  To “apprehend” something in the firm if mental grasp 
which is what the word means, we must discern something to 
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grasp.  We must (know to) turn toward it.  Because form and 
content cannot yet be distinct, we do this with a turn.  Indeed the 
ancient Greek word for such a “turn” is “trope,” which even the 
Greeks appreciated also as a prospective “figure” of speech, 
experience, making, perhaps even acting.6 
 
10 
 
Popular genres are families of figures.  Genres work as wholes; but 
they also perform in parts, subject to appropriation outside their 
usual milieus, as fragments when a familiar genre is in disarray, or 
as remnants when an earlier genre has been dispersed.  The 
conventional elements of genres, as of aesthetics in general, are 
figures.  Even as fragments and remnants, these figures inform our 
deeds, our words, our thoughts, even our sensations. 
 
 
11 
 
Figures and, thus, genres go together by elective affinity.7  We 
connect like with like as we discern and choose them.  
Prefigurations play a role, sometimes a decisive one.  Yet we can 
make different affinities as we like, individually but even more 
socially.  Popular genres work this way:  like cultural myths and 
cognitive networks, they are dynamic webs of associations.  The 
experiential activation of a node almost literally re-minds us of 
linked nodes to the degrees that they have been associated with the 
first, spreading the activation throughout the web.   Each 
experience reinforces associations that otherwise atrophy, even as 
it subtly or significantly alters them. 
 
 
12 
 
Popular films play prominent roles in our political cognition.  
Hollywood gives us figures for even beginning to sense political 
events.  This is always already a beginning for our response.  
Popular cinema is far from our only source of prefiguration for any 
phenomenal field, including the events of September 11 in 
particular or political terrorism in general.  Nonetheless movies do 
help prefigure our political experiences and responses, even when 
their figures have not cohered into a singular genre.  What we 
bring with us into new experiences, we may say, are less political 
facts than audiovisual “figures,” many from movies.8 
 
 
13 
 
As aesthetics, popular genres are conventional affinities among 
figures that help define one another.  The resurgent genre of noir 
does not have to link night and rain, but typically it does, and we 
know it in part from such figures.  Conventionally a noir 
protagonist encounters some dark night of the soul and needs a 
purging deluge.  The figures of night and rain enact or embellish 
such desired meanings through the “pathetic strategy” common in 
popular genres.9  And this holds even when both the night and the 
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rain might be, well, more figural than literal:  The Matrix give us 
green figures that rain down the black screens of computers like 
the deluge down a window pane at night.  The families of defining 
conventions for popular genres are far more numerous – and 
sometimes far more complicated – than any two or three figures 
such as night and rain.10  The relationship is not one of necessary 
conditions:  there are many noir films with no rain and now at 
least two with no night.11  Nor is the logic one of sufficient 
conditions:  there are innumerable movies with night and rain but 
no noir aesthetics.  Nor is the connection one of separate causes to 
contingent effects, as in behavioral paradigms for the social 
sciences.  Rather than atomistically mechanical, our aesthetics, 
genres, and figures are interdependently systemic.  Rather than 
specifying any directions or degrees of causation, the correlations 
worth tracing among figures, styles, themes, or other aspects of a 
genre can help us to appreciate their patterns of meaning.  What 
figures has Hollywood been generating for the phenomenal field of 
terrorism?  How do figures from popular cinema inform our 
political sense of what to say and do about terrorism?  The political 
aesthetics of horror, dystopia, thriller, and noir suggest answers. 
 
14 
 
And we need all four.  One remarkable development is that mythic 
figures of terrorism do not exactly constitute a singular genre or 
even a distinctive aesthetic.  That leaves political terror open to 
exploration in diverse genres with contrasting aesthetics.  As 
conventional networks of figures, popular genres of cinema have 
been shaping our senses of terrorist ends and means.  Four of 
these generic aesthetics seem especially relevant for informing how 
we experience terrorist events such as those on September 11 – 
and therefore how we respond to them.12 
 
 
 
 Horror and Evil  
 
15 
 
Apocalyptic reactions to 9/11 might suggest that the generic home 
for terrorism could, even should, be popular horror.  President 
George W. Bush immediately denounced all terrorism as 
unqualified “evil;” and the enduring phrase from his next State of 
the Union Address became the condemnation of Iran, Iraq, and 
North Korea for pursuing weapons of mass destruction and 
sponsoring international terrorism as “the Axis of Evil.”  Horror is 
the popular genre of evils.13  Yet the aesthetics and other 
conventions of popular horror have not figured prominently in any 
Hollywood treatments of political terrorism that come to mind, 
save for the dynamics of regime terrorism and war that Americans 
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elect to keep categorically separate from both “international 
terrorism” and “domestic terrorism.”14  The genre for regime 
terrorism has become dystopia, an outlying form of political horror 
analyzed in the next section.  War has a cinematic form of its own, 
of course, with war movies arguing generically that war is (not so 
much terror as) hell.15  When it comes to terrorism, however, the 
Hollywood dog that has not barked is horror.  Hence it helps to 
contrast terror with horror, as both a family of feelings and a 
popular genre of films. 
 
16 
 
Terror is the fraternal twin of horror.  As emotions and conditions, 
the two share much of their genetic material, yet they present 
distinct faces to the world.  Together terror and horror form a 
complex of action and feeling that can figure momentarily in 
almost any kind of drama or film.  Yet “horror” names a popular 
genre of movies, a whole family of conventions, whereas “terror” 
surfaces only in a few conventions of film.  And “terrorism” 
characterizes a prominent form of politics, while “horrorism” 
remains a word in waiting, with no referents for politics or 
otherwise.  Perhaps an implication is that the intertwined 
trajectories of horror and terror can be teased apart in the popular 
operation of politics and possibly in the generic apparatus of 
cinema.  How does Hollywood handle them? 
 
 
17 
 
Terror is the overwhelming dread-and-despair that puts us (or our 
movie stand-ins) at the categorical center of assault.  Or it does 
much the same by dispersing specific assaults into a continuing 
condition.  Terror radicalizes anxiety.  It projects death or 
degradation as immanent possibilities from almost any angle at 
any time in any place.  Therefore terror disables you from action.  
It diminishes personal movement into mere behavior.  It makes 
people flee or freeze in blind, frantic, unthinking aversion.  Terror 
overflows fear.  It overwhelms the appeal of fear to cognitive 
calculation of punishments and alternatives.  It shoves aside the 
calm, cool apparatus of rationality.  It panics people and destroys 
their identities as individual, responsible beings. It escalates and 
coagulates anxiety.  Terror preempts escape.  It prevents hope.16 
 
 
18 
 
Horror is the overwhelming dread-and-disgust that initially puts 
someone or something else at the center of assault.  Horror 
happens at first to us as onlookers.  We see atrocities that mock 
any possibility for goodness, truth, or beauty to remain unmixed 
with monstrosity.  Later in horror, however, we look around to 
realize that the source of perversion is turning to get us, the circle 
of corruption is coming to encompass us, the sinister system has 
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swallowed us whole.  Horror is revulsion for awful acts; it is 
repulsion from terrible entities.17  It stems from natural 
boundaries eradicated or cultural standards transcended.  Hence it 
springs from the strange territory of the uncanny and the sublime, 
where awful abominations and awesome absolutes turn into one 
another with each twist in perspective.  We might freeze in horror.  
Or we might refuse to recognize the horrors we glimpse, and go 
back to daily routines that pretend nothing major is awry.  Yet we 
also might turn to face horrors, making human sense of their 
threats and finding good ways to resist them.  Horror appalls and 
revolts; yet horror also can revolutionize, provoking fresh 
perspectives and effective inventions.  For good or ill, horror 
provokes extreme responses that range from willful oblivion to 
apocalyptic reckoning.  Terror disrupts and stops action by the 
victims; horror interrupts and radicalizes it.18 
 
19 
 
Terrorism can stem from criminals, from corrupt governments, 
from political or religious movements.  Sometimes it serves 
strategies of war, sometimes oppression, sometimes protest or 
resistance or rebellion or liberation, sometimes revenge and 
redistribution; other times psychosis, sheer destruction, or the 
emergence of some new kind of civilization.  At times, terrorism 
can operate through big-lie and brain-washing techniques.  It can 
use tactics of random death and disappearance.  It can impose iron 
discipline, work through mass hysteria, propagate paranoia, or rely 
on surveillance.  It can anonymize people beneath notice, let alone 
contempt.  It can debase or humiliate most abjectly.  It can 
concentrate citizens like pigs into pens.  It can isolate individuals 
like pigeons into holes or compartments.  It can drive parties, 
interests, even families underground.  It can incarcerate whole 
populations.  Nevertheless terror has stayed surprisingly separate 
from horror, with episodes of political terrorism as rare as a 
vampire’s reflections in the popular genre of horror. 
 
 
20 
 
Still there is an obvious objection to these contrasts between terror 
and horror.  It is the same objection that might be made to the 
claim that Hollywood seldom, if ever, treats political terrorism 
through the popular aesthetics of horror:  Do these contentions 
allow for the defining symbolism of generic horror?  Relentlessly 
the existentialist conventions of this genre disguise the daylight 
dynamics of psychology, society, history, economy, polity, and 
more within the nightmare figures of vampires, werewolves, 
witches, zombies, demons, ghosts, and myriad monsters; haunted 
houses and hidden lairs; magical spells and satanic rituals.  “Just 
as science fiction stories are popular science,” remarks horror 
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writer Dennis Etchison, “then horror stories are popular 
existentialism.”19  Who is to say that episodes of political terrorism 
are not amply and specifically evoked by Hollywood uses of 
existentialist symbolism in the genre of horror? 
 
21 
 
Yet film after film, intriguing glints of horror do not develop into 
sustained illuminations of terrorist politics.  Nor do possible hints 
do not turn into detailed subtexts of political terrorism.  These 
would be the ways to seek signs of political terrorism in horror 
movies:  as a New Yorker film critic has said, “The secret of horror 
movies is subtext – metaphors that attack like viruses and produce 
a fever of associations in our minds.”20  The few exceptions, where 
the symbols or subtexts do evoke political terrorism, leave us more 
with diffuse ideas than specific actions.  To me, at least, these 
possible turns to political terrorism remain too fragmentary, too 
momentary, for real contributions to structuring our sensibilities 
for terrorist acts.  At most, these cinematic signs in horror give 
mere glimpses:  neither articulate nor imaginative enough to 
prefigure a field of political terrorism addressed far more amply in 
thrillers and, perhaps increasingly, in noirs. 
 
 
22 
 
Unsurprisingly the (counter) examples of political terrorism that 
surface in the popular genre of horror tie most to regime 
terrorism.  The most vivid example I know is from Interview with 
the Vampire (1994), a cinematic allegory for horrors of the modern 
state.  Its figure for the fire-bombing of Germany and probably 
also for the nuclear holocaust suffered by Japan is the poignant 
pose of a vampire “mother” and “daughter” who hold each other in 
their arms while the sun burns them into an ashen monument that 
soon blows away on the breeze.21  The scene and its encompassing 
sequence evoke acts of totalitarian terrorism that induce the 
response of a terrorist campaign in war.  Notwithstanding 
considerable attention to these episodes of political terrorism 
before and after seeing the film, its imagery is enormously 
affecting.  Horror, like terror, can be overwhelming.22 
 
 
23 
 
If this were an exercise in the cinematic psychology of terrorism, 
we might try to probe the existential conventions of horror 
movies.  How might the seductive gaze and glamour of the vampire 
suggest how situations of terror draw us into self-destruction, even 
as they horrify and repulse us?  How might the dull gaze and crude 
appetites of the zombie show how terrorism takes away capacities 
for intelligent, truly political action?  How might the haunting chill 
of the ghost evoke the abiding hatred and corrosive guilt that keep 
terrorist acts from much success?  Horror might be ripe for use in 
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probing dynamics of political terror; in fact, however, it has not 
been turned often toward pointedly political acts.  In Danse 
Macabre, Stephen King talks of “the horror film as political 
polemic.”  But it is telling that his examples are entirely from the 
regions where horror overlaps science fiction, and King’s own 
forays into political horror seem to me to be science fiction first, 
horror only second.23  The single most visible exception associated 
with the current meisters of horror probably is The Dead Zone 
(1983), directed by David Cronenberg from a King novel of 
political apocalypse and assassination.24  (In the context presently 
at hand, the assassination of a political leader would not count as a 
terrorist act because it does not target civilians or other 
bystanders, a consideration emphasized in the King novel.) 
 
24 
 
Even so, it is intriguing to notice that four of the recent westerns I 
know to include tastes of political terrorism all appropriate figures 
of horror in this connection.  Unforgiven (1992) and The Quick 
and the Dead (1995) turn in important part on regime terrorism – 
in both cases as a figure for state terrorism.  The touches of horror 
in Unforgiven are subtle, but The Quick and the Dead includes a 
moldering black mansion and nightmare riders from the most 
horrific pages in The Lord of the Rings.25  Both Tombstone (1993) 
and Wyatt Earp (1994) show how Earp took the modern politics of 
enforcement and revenge beyond the bend into political terrorism; 
and both movies borrow visual and verbal devices of conventional 
horror to mark his departure from any stern, proportionate, or 
otherwise defensible endeavor.26  Do not expect to see these 
westerns in rosters of films that feature political acts of terrorism.  
Discussions with diverse viewers show that few recognize Earp’s 
acts as terrorism, even in glimmering ways, and western 
conventions overshadow figures of terror and horror in all four.  
Nonetheless they merit mention, since they suggest some 
cinematic routes to addressing political terrorism through figures 
of popular horror. 
 
 
 
 Dystopia and Totalitarianism  
 
25 
 
In regime terrorism, the political system targets its own 
inhabitants almost willy-nilly for atrocities such as arbitrary 
arrests, tortures, disappearances, poisons, bombings, or other 
radical disruptions.  The aim, insofar as there is a coherent idea at 
work, is to subjugate, humiliate, and dehumanize the 
population.27  In other words, the anti-political purpose of regime 
terror soon turns into power and cruelty for their own insanely 
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sadistic sake.  Picture, wrote George Orwell, “a boot stamping on a 
human face – forever.”28  This is the totalitarian nightmare of 
systematic regime terror that drove the democratic imagination 
throughout most of the twentieth century.29  By the start of the 
twenty-first century, events and Hollywood had begun to supplant 
totalitarian control and regime terrorism with terrorism by 
movements and insurgent conspiracies as the western template for 
political hell on earth. 
 
26 
 
Regime terrorism virtually defines its own (sub)genre of 
dystopia.30  This articulates the horror archetype of the Bad Place 
into an intricate and far-reaching web of figures that remains even 
today America’s primary epitome of political horror.31  Hollywood 
seldom produces films in this mode, in important part because 
relentless downers do not draw lots of viewers or make much 
money.  As far as Hollywood is concerned, dystopia is less a genre 
in its own right than a subgenre.  It is more a subgenre of science 
fiction than horror.  And it tends to omit specific acts of political 
terrorism.  Two of the best dystopias that focus on terrorist acts 
are popular Middle-Eastern, rather than Hollywood, films:  Bab el 
Oued City and The Tornado. Remarkable as well is The Day After 
(1983), one of the more sensational movies made for television.  Its 
terrorizing regime is the international system of nuclear 
deterrence during the Cold War.  When the system of Mutual 
Assured Destruction breaks down, the resulting nuclear holocaust 
becomes an act of political terrorism that produces an unremitting 
nightmare.  Yet none of these three films seems important, at least 
for Americans, in prefiguring political terrorism regarded as 
specific acts by insurgents or anti-western movements. 
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When Hollywood does venture a dystopia, it is apt to slide from 
terrorism that targets bystanders to ruthless regimes of 
surveillance, torture, and punishment that identify dissidents and 
do them in.  Presumably the judgment is that this makes 
motivations more comprehensible, plots tighter, and settings more 
plausible for viewers used to people and practices that calculate 
interests for efficient means to given ends.  Brazil (1985) and the 
1984 version of 1984 are ready examples.  As a result, the political 
terrorism crucial for the dynamics of totalitarian regimes – and 
apparent also in the actions of some authoritarian polities – 
seldom surfaces in Hollywood dystopias.  For political theorists, 
terrorism by totalitarian regimes is arbitrary in many particular 
instances but endemic to the system.  It is, in a word, systemic.  
For Hollywood movies, political terrorism is occasional and 
instrumental.  It springs from relatively specific grievances even 
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though it targets civilians who lack any direct role in producing the 
grievances. 
 
28 
 
Again, though, there is a complication.  For reasons of dramatic 
economy and punch, as well as ideology, Hollywood seldom 
portrays political or other systems overtly as such, in fully literal 
terms.  Instead movies rely on the trope of conspiracy.32  Examples 
are easy.  The Parallax View (1974) uses an assassination 
conspiracy to trace symbolically how America’s two-party system 
squelches political dissent.  Conspiracy Theory (1997) does the 
same to probe oppressive aspects of the political system of the 
national-security state.  The Skulls (2000) evokes Yale’s notorious 
secret society for the Bushes to suggest how political elites 
systematically extend themselves in democratic times.  From Hell 
(2001) also deploys a secret society to indict how Victorian culture 
systematically exploits and represses middle-class dreams and 
personal freedoms.33  In popular cinema, conspiracies abound. 
 
 
 
 Thrillers and Conspiracies  
 
29 
 
By convention, nonetheless, conspiracies have their primary 
Hollywood home in thrillers.  Not entirely by coincidence, thrillers 
are the principal genre for films that feature acts of political 
terrorism.  Thrillers typically give viewers unqualified heroes, 
heroines, and villains.  Yet thriller settings are more familiar, 
realistic, and up-to-date than those for the far-larger-than-life 
figures in action-adventure films, let alone superhero movies.  In 
fact, such settings define subgenres for thrillers.  These span 
international intrigues, criminal connivances, governmental and 
military contests, foreign wars, political potboilers, police stories, 
business tales, medical sagas, legal dramas, and others at the edges 
of neighboring genres like detection or action-adventure.  The 
Hollywood disposition to emplot political terrorism in thrillers has 
several implications for the figures of terrorism widely available to 
Americans in experiencing events in the wake of 9/11. 
 
 
30 
 
The academy and the press share an unfortunate penchant for 
literalistic criticisms of the Hollywood fondness for conspiracies.  
We all know the refrain:  how epistemically implausible, how 
social-scientifically unsophisticated, and how politically 
irresponsible it is to portray some cabal as running the world from 
behind the scenes.34  Political scientists have wondered in print 
whether such Hollywood scripts are written by political rubes who 
know little about systems or art – and hence personalize 
everything simplistically – or by political extremists from the left 
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and right who compulsively demonize a few foes as responsible for 
all the things that go wrong with their worlds.35  Almost anywhere 
we turn, and not just Hollywood, American rhetorics of conspiracy 
are more sophisticated than these options conceive.36  Yet the 
frowning equation of conspiracy with crackpot politics surely 
creeps into American notions of terrorism when popular films 
insistently show political terrorism conducted by conspiracy. 
 
31 
 
This is not to say that popular cinema errs in connecting terrorist 
acts with conspiratorial politics.  Conspiracies in a literal sense can 
be prominent devices of political struggle, especially in republics.  
Rome named conspiracies (from the Latin with-breath) for 
reliance on planning in whispers outside the hearing of courts or 
publics.37  In popular movies with sustained moments of political 
terrorism, literal conspiracies must be rife.  How could they be 
missing most of the time, when the ruling regimes in Hollywood 
films are seldom the sources of terrorism?  For a group to conceive 
and conduct illegal acts without preemption by any regime that 
enforces its laws, secret communication is crucial:  actual 
conspiracy is a must.  Even the peculiar acts of political terrorism 
that do not primarily target a state or regime tend to attack both 
secondarily.  Such terrorism impugns the legitimacy of states and 
regimes by demonstrating that they cannot meet their 
responsibility to provide domestic tranquility – by protecting 
civilians from violence. 
 
 
32 
 
Yet if conspiracies appear in many films with political terrorism, 
and if conspiracies can be Hollywood figures for political systems, 
how can I say with confidence that few Hollywood films so far have 
addressed regime terrorism – even in contrast with the run-of-the-
mill devices of political oppression portrayed at least in passing by 
thousands of popular movies?  Might the terrorist conspiracies in 
Hollywood cinema often turn out to symbolize terrorist systems – 
and thus regime terrorism?  Possibly, but concerted efforts to 
think through the symbols in the films at issue leaves me without a 
single clear example.  It is not that regime terrorism never surfaces 
at all in Hollywood films.  Rather it appears seldom and mostly as 
a sideshow, not as the focus. 
 
 
33 
 
Conceptually and politically, it helps to distinguish occasional 
conspiracies within larger plots from plots that are conspiracies 
overall.  Among recent thrillers, some forty stress political 
terrorism.  At least thirty include some sort of conspiracy in their 
plots, although it often is the merest kind of criminal conspiracy.  
Yet only four of these films have conspiracy plots overall.38  The 
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ratios are telling:  three-fourths of the plots with acts of political 
terrorism have conspiracies, but only one-tenth are conspiracies.  
Arlington Road (1999) sounds an alarm about the American 
militia movement, and it shows how terrorists can use benign 
politics within America against the government.  The Package 
(1989) offers an assassination conspiracy at the end of the Cold 
War.  The Siege warns that terrorism can happen here, might elicit 
an authoritarian and racist response, and could go so far as to 
provoke something like regime terrorism. 
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To emplot terrorism in thrillers is to endow its politics with clear 
heroes and monstrous villains, both acting from motives more 
personal than ideological.  Thrillers treat terrorism as political 
violence against bystanders – by contrast with military combatants 
and public officials.  This accords with a classic definition of 
political terrorism.39  (And it suggests that we set aside for now the 
many thrillers about actions against political figures.)  In thrillers, 
this puts terrorists unarguably in the wrong:  thrillers seldom 
explore the complications in how one cause’s terrorist can be 
another’s freedom fighter.  To do that might take tragedy of a 
classical kind.  This is rare in popular films, but among movies on 
political terrorism perhaps The Crying Game (1992) and The 
Boxer (1997) come close, and it is notable that neither is exactly a 
Hollywood product. 
 
 
35 
 
The notion of terrorism as attacking innocents for political gain 
does not fit the genres of horror and dystopia.  In horror, adults 
are guilty, secretly if not originally.  That is how they can know and 
combat (but also be) the monsters.  Children might begin as 
innocents, yet they must develop the moral and political 
sophistication born of facing their own eventual evils if they are to 
survive monstrous attacks.  The systematic, encompassing 
corruption of dystopias means that the civilians targeted by the 
regime share responsibility for its terrorism.  As theorists have 
made painfully clear, the subjects of totalitarianism contribute to 
terrorizing themselves.40  Hence there is little room in horror or 
dystopia for the dynamics of political terrorism that turn on 
victimizing bystanders.  In the systems of transgression and guilt 
that both those genres present, nobody is a bystander.  Of course, 
that argument is congenial to political terrorists who take 
themselves to attack oppressive regimes where, if you are not part 
of the solution, you are part of the problem.  To date, though, 
terrorists have not made many popular movies, let alone 
Hollywood releases.41  Accordingly the thriller has become the 
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Hollywood genre of choice for facing political terrorism. 
 
36 
 
But we misestimate the craft of popular movies if we infer that 
Hollywood merely turns terrors into thrills.  Critics and scholars 
do complain that Hollywood thrillers cheapen the politics and 
denature the terrors.42  That happens in some thrillers, but it is not 
the generic pattern.  Part of the misunderstanding arises from the 
modern inclination to treat politics as exhausted by the operations 
of government and ideology.  Not even thrillers about political 
terrorism show much interest in political ideologies, although the 
films do give considerable attention to machinations of 
government in combating terrorism.  Fortunately for us, there are 
many other kinds of politics, they are amply evident in electronic 
times, and they play signal roles in thrillers on terrorism.43  These 
surface in the political projects attributed to the terrorists as 
villains.  That their politics seldom fit such modern ideologies of 
politics as liberalism, socialism, and conservatism or even the likes 
of fascism, nazism, and communism should not surprise us.  Most 
terrorist politics have been postmodern or anti-western, and many 
terrorist thrillers do engage such politics literally or figurally.44  
Thrillers also attend to the political projects enacted by the heroes 
who resist assaults by terrorists.  Again this becomes easier to 
recognize when we encompass subtexts and we open our eyes to 
politics that exceed the forms most familiar to modern scholars.45 
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On occasion, a thriller features coequal heroes – or heroines.  Then 
their interplay may be as important to the thriller’s politics as any 
struggles between the heroes and villains.  This is particularly true 
when a thriller taps conventions from such genres as romance, 
odd-couple films, or buddy movies.  Among thrillers on terrorism, 
The Peacemaker (1997) is a case in point.  Heroine Nicole Kidman 
enacts a liberal analyst of intelligence, Dr. Julia Kelly.  She is an 
academician transplanted into government.  Hero George Clooney 
plays a republican actor, not accidentally a military man:  
Lieutenant Colonel Thom Devoe.  The film shows how they must 
marry their efforts in order to withstand a terrorist act born of 
humanist despair unto nihilism. 
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This leaves The Peacemaker comparable to The Siege in 
suggesting that the United States needs to work as a liberal 
republic in order to survive, whether as the lone superpower taking 
primary responsibility for a nuclear world or as the leading ally in 
a multilateral effort through the United Nations.  Otherwise 
neither the U.S. nor the U.N. can withstand the asymmetrical 
warfare from terrorists with access to weapons of mass 
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destruction.  In The Peacemaker, it is telling that the liberal 
analyst must persuade the republican actor to take seriously the 
political motives, especially the ideological causes, of terrorists.  As 
a military man, Devoe has learned scorn for the supposedly 
political reasons of most people, including terrorists, who operate 
in an increasingly globalized world of would-be profiteers.  Maybe 
Devoe has been reading too many books about the onward march 
of globalization.46  Or maybe he has been watching too many 
Hollywood thrillers like the Die Hard and Speed films, where the 
apparent terrorism turns out to be a smokescreen for garden-
variety robbery.) 
 
39 
 
Stanley Cavell provides a beautiful analysis of the mid-twentieth-
century “Hollywood comedy of remarriage.”47  The Peacemaker 
might be more or less a thriller of remarriage.  It starts logically 
from the destroyed marriage of the eventual villain, a professor of 
music and political activist who has lost his wife and daughter to 
warfare when America and its N.A.T.O. allies attempted to impose 
order on the disintegrating Balkans, Bosnia-Herzogovina, 
Yugoslavia, or whatever label might make most sense for the 
moment.  The wife and daughter were civilians caught in the 
crossfire.  They were bystanding victims of semi-advertent, busy-
body terrorism – as the professor experiences it.  Acting from 
despair at any decent future, with his marriage and his community 
gone, the professor contrives to bring the terror home to its 
careless perpetrators in New York City.  In diagnosing then 
responding to his terrorist project, the movie weaves a 
replacement marriage.  Step by step, it intertwines the components 
initially pitted against one another in the pairing of Lieutenant 
Colonel Devoe with Ph.D. Kelly: 
 
 
 
 
male vs. female 
military vs. civilian 
economic vs. political 
anti-crime vs. anti-terrorism 
practice vs. theory 
action vs. thought 
reality vs. academy 
reality vs. bureaucracy 
brute force vs. civilized negotiation 
low culture vs. high culture 
trust vs. distrust 
 
 
  
 
To face and defeat the world-destroying powers soon to be in the 
possession of terrorists, The Peacemaker suggests that America  
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must reunite these long-alienated identities and capacities.  That is 
a pretty tall order.  But if anybody is up to this task of remarriage, 
Hollywood can help. 
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Indeed it can call its hero of heroes to the task.48  True Lies (1994) 
is a remarriage thriller that is equally a comedy of remarriage.  The 
matrimonial union between Harry Tasker (Arnold 
Schwarzenegger) and his wife, Helen (Jamie Lee Curtis), drifts 
then begins to unravel piece by piece in the first half of the film.  
So the second half reweaves it.  Along the way, of course, the 
political terrorists get identified and defeated, while the Taskers 
and the audience share comic thrills from James Cameron.  The 
system of the national-security state achieves respect, rescue, and 
restoration.  Overall the politics are ideologically conservative:  no 
great surprise with Arnold in the lead.  But again aesthetics trump 
ideologies:  comedy devolves into farce, thriller heroism escalates 
into super-heroism, and the conservative outrage at terrorism 
turns into the sly romance of bystanders striking back.  Nuclear 
annihilation of the Florida Keys begins as a terrorist atrocity, but it 
becomes merely a colorful prelude to fun on the dance floor. 
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The Sum of All Fears is complicated because there are two sets of 
obstacles for the hero.  The overt villains are nazis who crave world 
domination, and they provoke the crisis typical for thrillers.  Yet 
the crisis would not occur were there no quasi-Cold War 
confrontation remaining between Russia and the United States as 
the world’s two nuclear powers of greatest note.  The government 
officials in Russia and the United States are driven in conventional 
thriller fashion by personal and political imperatives that boil 
down to upholding the honor of their own sides. 
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Jack Ryan (Ben Affleck) must exercise a cool calculation of 
interests based on a mastery of information about characters and 
conditions in order to take the Russians and Americans out of their 
escalating showdown over national and individual honor.  In 
regard to the Russians and Americans, therefore, Ryan is a critical 
historian who promotes the liberal politics of a larger rationality of 
knowledge and human interests.  This averts disaster from the 
republican dialectic of honor and anger, with affronts escalating 
into all-out war.  Thus it replays the political lessons promoted by 
proto-liberal theorists such as Thomas Hobbes and John Locke. 
 
 
43 
 
In response to the international gang of resurgent nazis, by 
contrast, Affleck’s figure is the dashing hero familiar from spy-vs.-
spy thrillers.  He shows his excellence in action through daring,  
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perseverance, improvisation, and martial arts.  The nazi terrorists 
instigate the crisis, but the nuclear powers complicate it.  Thus the 
first skein of the plot is republican, and the second is liberal.  Ryan 
helps America and the world limit nazi terrorism and avenge nazi 
evil.  He also helps Russia and the United States escape from the 
terrible system of escalating grudges. 
 
44 
 
The academic caricature of thrillers would take their conventions 
of heroism and villainy to mean especially short shrift for the 
grievances of terrorists.  That is what The Sum of All Fears gives us 
for the nazi terrorism:  little sense of what grievances the gang 
might have or why, and no sympathy at all for its politics.  The 
larger part of the movie, however, concerns motivations for 
Russian and American acts that provide chilling parallels to the 
nazi terrorism.  These receive careful exposition in words as well as 
colorful articulation in symbols both aural and visual.  The film 
cultivates some sympathy for grievances on each side, even as it 
criticizes every turn toward terrorism.  The genre does much the 
same.  Roughly a fourth of the time, it disregards grievances 
altogether, at least in recent offerings.  Half of the time, it 
discredits grievances emphatically and perhaps one-sidedly.  But 
the other fourth of thrillers on terrorism delve more respectfully, 
even sympathetically at times, into the motivations for political 
terror.  Thrillers condemn terrorism as violence against more or 
less innocent bystanders; yet this does not keep the genre from 
detailed, and sometimes supportive, consideration of troubles that 
generate political terrorism.  Hollywood thrillers have been more 
subtle and intelligent than we might expect in prefiguring 
terrorism.  In movies such as The Siege, the genre even warns 
against accommodating terrorists by responding to their attacks 
with misdirected or disproportionate retaliation, suspension of 
civil liberties, and regime terror.  Thrillers show more than a 
modicum of sophistication about political terrorism. 
 
 
 
 Noir and Sophistication  
 
45 
 
It is no wonder, then, that Hollywood has started blending thrillers 
with noirs in order to tackle political terrorism with even greater 
flair and sophistication.  In some Hollywood quarters, noir films 
seem little more than thrillers become acutely stylish, self-aware, 
and sophisticated.  In others, the mark of noir is realism, in a 
strongly stylized sense.  This realism encompasses seedy settings, 
grainy colors, and many shadows.  It also means moral malaise, 
political hardball, and rhetorical savvy in social systems that 
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ensnare people left and right.  Noir is a genre ready-made for the 
complexities of political terrorism along with attempts to preempt, 
repudiate, or punish it. 
 
46 
 
As political terrorists began targeting the United States more 
intensely in the 1990s, film noir was returning to the fore in 
popular movies.  The genre had flourished in the 1940s and ’50s.  
Then noir subsided so much in prominence that some scholars 
defined it as a delimited period rather than a continuing genre.  
When you look for them, of course, there turn out to have been 
more than ten noir films released every decade in the 1960s, ’70s, 
and ’80s.  Nevertheless the Hollywood proportion of noir films had 
declined, and a few shining exceptions like Chinatown (1974) 
showed how marginal to the aesthetics of Hollywood in this 
interregnum generic noir had become.  By the second half of the 
’80s, however, film noir was making a comeback.  The ’90s viewed 
some fifty new noirs, and the resurgent genre once more became a 
prominent Hollywood source of sights, sounds, and stories.49  If 
we reckon that the new century began in 2000, we may say that 
already it has contributed another thirty noir films.50 
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Accordingly noir aesthetics have been amply available to help 
Americans experience the terrorist atrocities of September 11, 
2001; and this Hollywood genre is making an impact on our 
political sensibilities.  When Maureen Dowd, the national 
weathervane of the New York Times, addressed that day’s terrorist 
attacks, she took her title from a famous noir film by Orson 
Welles.  It recently had been re-released in a “director’s cut,” based 
on requests that Welles made of the studio, which had edited his 
footage into a logical mess.  His movie still was powerful enough 
aesthetically to attract popular attention half a century later.  
“Touch of Evil,” Dowd called her take on the world in the wake of 
September 11.  She began a commentary with the look and feel of a 
genre renowned for painting gray on gray:  “I’ve always loved film 
noir.  The grays, the shadows, the mysterious webs of murder, 
deception and corruption, the morally ambiguous characters.”  
Nonetheless, she wrote, “I never expected to see a noir shadow fall 
on the white marble hive of Washington.  The film noir hero, as 
Nicholas Christopher wrote, descends ‘into an underworld, on a 
spiral.’  The object of his quest ‘is elusive,’ and he is beset ‘by 
agents of a larger design of which he is only dimly aware.’”51 
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Like most fans, Dowd seems to have thrilled to the genre’s 
ambiguities, its sophisticated sense of foggy complications making 
for steamy mysteries and stories of the American dream undone by  
John S. Nelson 97 Poroi, 2, 1, August, 2003 
its own ambitions.  Even by October, Dowd could observe how 
“Sept. 11 was a day of crystalline certainty.  Thousands of innocent 
people were dead.  We had to find the murderers and unleash 
hell.”  Soon there were complications.  “But after that things got 
weirdly muddied.  We would have been prepared for a 
conventional war outside our borders.  But we were not prepared 
for the terrorists’ unconventional war inside our heads.  We went 
from never imagining the damage the barbarians inside our gates 
could do to imagining little else.”  Noir contributed to the 
imagining.  Even before the United States became super-serious 
about political terrorism, noir had started to edge into the field of 
popular films about it.  Fight Club, Spy Game, and Swordfish 
feature the looks, sounds, and structures of film noir; and they are 
three of the more provocative treatments of political terrorism to 
issue from Hollywood. 
 
49 
 
Fight Club and Swordfish pay special attention to spectacle, a 
shared concern of terrorism and cinema.52  Gabriel Weimann and 
Conrad Winn maintain that “the essence of terrorism is the actual 
or threatened use of violence against victims of symbolic 
importance in such a way as to gain psychological impact for the 
purpose of achieving political objectives.”53  Spectacle is what 
terrorists promote for this purpose, and spectacle is the stock-in-
trade of popular cinema.54  As a genre, film noir has developed an 
acute concern for the engines and dangers of spectacle.55 
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The terrorists who star in Fight Club and Swordfish both pursue 
the politics of spectacle.  In doing this, these characters claim 
superior realism, yet neither film is the least inclined toward 
mundane realism in story or cinematic style.  Instead they share 
the sophisticated realism of noir, and they use the genre to expose 
the corruption of spectacular societies as systems that invite the 
politics of terror.  Such stylish realism stems from their 
attunement to the cinematic construction of political realities in 
America – and the world that its media have been busy 
globalizing.  The movies’ cinematic devices of terrorism display 
this knowledge, though playfully in both cases.  This locates them 
in the family of films such as Simone (2002), 15 Minutes (2001), 
EdTV (1999), Pleasantville (1998), The Truman Show (1998), 
Mad City (1997), and Wag the Dog (1997) that play reflectively 
and prophetically with media construction.  Most of the films with 
political acts of terrorism show some awareness of such media 
dynamics and their postmodern politics.  Yet among these, only 
Three Kings (1999) and possibly Spy Game also might qualify for 
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the family of films that emphasize dynamics of media construction. 
 
51 
 
The specific brands of postmodern politics in Fight Club and 
Swordfish are exceptionally debatable as to types.  Swordfish has 
an anti-terrorist terrorist named Gabriel and played by John 
Travolta.  By the end of Swordfish, Gabriel’s terrorism is financing 
his own foreign and military policy of counter-terrorist vengeance.  
This radical, perhaps satirical adjustment of domestic and 
international politics seems somewhat anarchical in ideology but 
even more in style.  The later politics of terrorism in Fight Club 
also might be categorized as anarchical – or nihilist, since its 
movement named Project Mayhem claims to pursue a fanaticism 
of destruction.  The obliteration of civilization by bombing credit 
records is to plunge the world into a kind of chaos.  That should 
return sophisticated cities from the corrupt “barbarism of 
reflection” to the noble “barbarism of sense,” as the republican 
theorist Giambattista Vico long ago contrasted those two 
conditions.56  Western civilization knows this situation, without 
government as hierarchical rule, to be anarchy in a sense that 
traces back to Thomas Hobbes. 
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Yet the charismatic project of liberation by Tyler Durden, the 
protagonist in Fight Club, is devoted less to eliminating all 
hierarchical order than to reviving pure, impulsive, perfectionist 
action by Nietzschean nobles in a setting before the West was 
won.  The movie makes such a masculinist trajectory at least 
borderline patriarchial, hence incipiently hierarchical, though 
cultic would be a better category.  There is in Swordfish, by 
contrast, no perfectionist celebration of impulsive action or 
primitive cult-ure.57  Its violence of terrorism is not a Dionysian 
rite, as in Fight Club, but a hardball device for trumping violent 
terrorists.  Gabriel is a planner who leaves few probabilities 
uncalculated.  His enterprise is eminently sophisticated, if fatally 
cynical – at least to others.  Therefore the politics of Swordfish are 
“anarchical,” whereas the politics of Fight Club are “perfectionist” 
and Nietzschean,  In neither film, though, is the ideology half so 
detailed or influential politically as the aesthetics of noir.  Neither 
film offers a sober, respectable take on terrorism; and both 
mobilize noir in similarly playful ways.  Yet both have become cult 
favorites by featuring noir conventions for configuring and 
prefiguring our senses of political terrorism. 
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Spy Game uses the stylish realism of noir to indict terrorist tactics 
by covert operatives for the United States.  It moves good-hearted 
but hard-boiled protagonists played by Brad Pitt and Robert  
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Redford from CIA assassinations during the Vietnam War, Cold 
War betrayals in Berlin, and political bombings in Beirut, to 
ruthless trade struggles with China.  The film fully acknowledges 
that American enemies also terrorize, but it suggests that many of 
America’s hard choices have come mainly from being all too hard-
headed and heavy-handed in foreign policies.  Noir tropes 
sophisticate the thriller politics until, by the end, personal ties lead 
the protagonists to renounce the room that Realpolitick makes for 
sacrificing bystanders to larger political causes. 
 
54 
 
Like horror and dystopia, noir suspects that systems entrap us 
even in the most ordinary of everyday activities.  The leading 
figures in noir films are nothing like innocent.  When they try 
hardest to be bystanders, stepping aside from the fray or 
pretending that they can stay aloof from the systematic corruption, 
their ignorance ruins their own efforts and other people’s lives.  
Yet the wake-up calls that rouse noir protagonists to recognize 
their perils and responsibilities activate their residual virtues.  
These reconstruct the shadows and mirrors of politics into rights 
and wrongs that make human sense in fallen worlds far from pure 
innocence or absolute evil.  In some ways, we all participate in the 
regime, the system, the transgressions, even the terrors.  But in 
other ways, there can be bystanders, civilians, victims outside any 
proper scope of violence – notwithstanding their real 
contributions, conscious or not, to acts that outrage others.  In 
noir, we can learn how war and terror and freedom-fighting and all 
other politics face complications that should induce a sense of 
limits along with a capacity of self-criticism. 
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Noir sprang from the literary (sub)genre of hardboiled detection.  
In the 1920s and ’30s, the “roman noir” had turned the upper-
crust amateur detective operating in the milieu of the country 
manor into a sometimes suave but always hard-bitten private eye 
who scrambles to make a living from the seamy side of the city. 58  
Like hardboiled detection, classical film noir situates itself in the 
gritty night of an endlessly corrupt city under siege in every 
direction from criminals and political manipulators.59  As a “lone 
knight of justice,” the noir detective cannot hope to restore order 
or impose justice on the model of the classical detective.  He is in 
over his head, and his interventions in the ongoing dynamics of 
crime are more likely to aggravate the harm than heal even a small 
part of the city.  Even when the protagonist of classical noir is not 
exactly a detective – but more a minor-league Faust who blunders 
toward personal, moral, social, and political catastrophe – the 
most he can manage is to leave behind a lesson:  his cautionary 
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tale about how things went wrong. 
 
56 
 
Dowd observed that “The last thing this country wanted was to be 
pulled into another hostile, unfamiliar landscape or more political 
quicksand.  Even in our national discourse, we rejected 
ambiguities, preferring the thumbs up-thumbs down, who’s in-
who’s out, box office winner-box office loser sureties.  But now 
we’re enmeshed in ambiguity.  First we wanted to bomb 
Afghanistan.  Then, when we saw the suffering of the people there, 
we wanted to send food.  Now we may bomb them with missiles 
and care packages.”  This fits the chiaroscuro complexity of noir.  
“President Bush is struggling with geopolitical jujitsu.  Our old 
enemy Russia is our new ally.  Our old ally Israel is accusing us of 
appeasing the Arabs.  We have to now trust countries we 
distrusted, like Pakistan.  We have to hand out bribes and play 
footsie with those who tolerated and sheltered and exported 
terrorists – and may again.”  As Dowd concluded, “Our desire for 
justice remains unambiguous.  Beyond that, as Keats wrote, “there 
is nothing stable in the world; uproar’s your only music.”  The 
classical sensibility of noir finds abyss and chaos just below the 
surface.  It experiences ruin and corruption perceptible through 
the pretty pretensions and petty sophistications of the city. 
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Classical noir always favored Los Angeles as its sin city.  As a city, 
however, L.A. was always already decentered and postmodern:   
more a ramshackle network of suburbs in search of a city than a 
gleaming beacon on the hill of western imagination.60  Film noir 
establishes L.A. with shots from the hill.  These look down on a 
tangle of freeways, aqueducts, and subdivisions in a valley shading 
into smog and night.  The Hollywood sign of celebrity culture and 
politics labels a neighboring hill.  Hollywood films show Arab 
terrorists in particular as coming from the dark warrens, bright 
deserts, and sun-washed cities of the Middle East; and the L.A. of 
film noir manages all three at once, as well as unreal downpours of 
rain that never can wash the city clean.  When we witness a New 
York suffocated in ash and smoke and grit, or we look upon the 
ruined-coliseum made by fallen fragments from the twin towers of 
the World Trade Center, we see with Dowd a noir city left in the 
twilight of the idols. 
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Resurgent noir turns the fatally sophisticated city not only into 
suburbs but also into the abstracted systems of domination and 
corruption long excoriated by the existentialists.61  The targets, 
dynamics, and consequences of political terrorism find themselves 
and lend themselves to noirish figures that include rather than 
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excuse ourselves from the picture. 
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Not long after reading Dowd, I attended a POROI Rhetoric 
Symposium on responses to the terrorist attacks of 9/11.62  The 
conference guide to art exhibits, academic panels, and original 
performances runs almost forty pages, and its cover shows in 
noirish silhouette an airplane flying in the soft gray air over a New 
York skyline that still featured the twin towers.  For the first day, 
the conference managers projected this grim, funereal image in 
grayscale on a big screen behind the symposiasts.  Throughout the 
second day, participants watched video ruminations on the 9/11 
aftermath, photographs of Ground Zero and the informal 
memorials taking shape around it, and a drama on naming the 
dead:  the victims in New York, Washington, and Pennsylvania.  
Every one of the videos, pictures, and performances glowered with 
shadowy-gray sensibility of noir.  More ominous even than the 
stark blacks, whites, and reds of horror, the chiaroscuro 
sophistication of noir gave the occasion a somber sense of the fatal 
perplexities of political terror.  Similar effects can be seen in the 
Hollywood turn to noir as a generic setting for coming to terms 
with terrorism. 
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Wallace Stevens said that “Politic man ordained / Imagination as 
the fateful sin.”63  For a civilization now learning more than it ever 
wanted to know about the politics of terror, noir is a popular genre 
that has much to recommend it.  The shadowy shapes of twin 
towers at the World Trade Center collapse into a flash of fire, a 
rain of ash, a darkness of more than night and rubble.  These are 
powerful figures from noir for the terrorism now emerging in 
Hollywood’s politics – and our own. 
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